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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the determinants of expenses for Portuguese real estate funds from 2007 to 
2012 and is a pioneer study on the determinants of expenses concerning real estate funds. Closed-
end and open-end real estate funds benefit from economies of scale. However, the most important 
result of this study concerns the fiscal policy implemented by the Portuguese authorities during 
the 1980s. Closed-end funds flourished by capturing tax benefits, even in the event that risk was 
not rewarded by return. Investors created financial instruments in which to allocate their real 
assets, instead of holding them individually.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The role of fees (management, custody, auditing, supervision and auditing) charged by 
mutual funds and the analysis of their determinants has been debated since the 1990s. 
Expenses are a key element in regard to examining the performance of managers and are 
often observed as an important component for the presentation of poor performance by 
mutual funds. However, no consensus has formed on this topic (see Otten and Bams 
(2002) and Wermers (2000)). At the same time, the determinants of mutual fund expenses 
have also been studied by many researchers (vd. Dellva and Olson (1998), LaPlante 
(2001), Luo (2002), Korkeamaki and Smythe (2004) and Korpela and Puttonen (2006), 
for example). These authors consider many independent variables to explain the 
determinants of mutual fund expenses, namely size, risk, return, category, and turnover, 
among others. 
This study differs from the previous research on fund expenses because it only 
considers real estate funds. It is an innovative and pioneering study on real estate finance 
and should serve as a basis for analysing and comparing the expenses of closed-end funds 
and open-end funds, different managers, different regulatory environments and different 
fiscal regimes.  However, must be highlighted that Alves (2015) compared the fees 
charged by mutual and real estate funds. The main objective of the current study is to 
evaluate the determinants of expenses for real estate funds domiciled in Portugal.  
The first regulatory framework for Portuguese real estate funds (fundos de 
investimento imobiliário) was presented in the mid-1980s and bears similarities with the 
Italian and the Spanish real estate fund industry. Fundraising to finance real estate 
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development activity, the best allocation of financial resources and the promotion of 
economic growth served as the impetus to introduce these financial instruments. The 
development of the real estate funds industry was accomplished by the Portuguese 
government authorities’ promotion of an aggressive tax policy. In the late 1980s, the 
authorities created a legal framework for closed-end funds with the primary objective of 
overcoming the difficulties previously imposed in terms of asset allocation in that 
category of funds. The Portuguese real estate funds industry flourished primarily through 
the activity of closed-end funds. In the early 2000s, the industry had 3,000 million euros 
under management and 40 real estate funds, of which 20 were closed-end with a net asset 
value of 1,000 million of euros; in 2012, the industry was worth 12,000 million euros 
spread over 260 funds, of which 240 were closed-end with 7,000 million euros under 
management. Closed-end funds developed largely due to the tax regime created by 
Portuguese authorities and by asset managers who built the financial instrument under an 
approach that involved customization to meet customers´ needs. Generally speaking, this 
financial instrument has a small number of participants, which stands in contrast to open-
end funds. In the face of this environment closed-end real estate funds, in general, are 
managed by independent fund management companies, which contrasts with open-end 
funds that are managed by fund management companies integrated with financ ia l 
institutions due to the need for branches to sell such financial instruments.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the sample, the determinants of 
expenses of real estate funds and the methodology. Section 3 discusses the results, and 
Section 4 concludes. 
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2. Sample, determinants of expenses, hypothesis and methodology 
 
The database is original and was built after consulting the reports of real estate funds 
managed in Portugal from 2007 to 2012. We use a balanced panel of 102 real estate funds 
divided between 92 closed-end and 10 open-end funds. To evaluate the survivor bias, we 
also considered an unbalanced panel that varies between 112 and 208 observations.    
The expenses are the sum of management fees, custody fees and auditing and 
supervisory fees divided by the fund´s net asset value. Front loads and redemption fees 
are not considered in this research. In general, average fees charged by real estate 
companies decreased in the period under consideration. This occurred for all of the 
samples, including closed-end and open-end funds (see table I, panels A, B and C).     
 
Table I – Descriptive Analysis of Expenses 
Panel A- All Sample 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Mean 0.85% 0.82% 0.82% 0.83% 0.83% 0.74% 
Median 0.66% 0.65% 0.64% 0.63% 0.62% 0.60% 
Maximum 4.38% 4.41% 4.40% 5.86% 5.86% 2.86% 
Minimum 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.07% 0.00% 
Stand. Dev. 0.59% 0.59% 0.59% 0.71% 0.70% 0.48% 
Nº OBS 102 102 102 102 102 102 
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Panel B – Closed-end Funds 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Mean 0.79% 0.76% 0.76% 0.77% 0.78% 0.70% 
Median 0.60% 0.59% 0.59% 0.60% 0.59% 0.57% 
Maximum 4.38% 4.41% 4.40% 5.86% 5.86% 2.86% 
Minimum 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.07% 0.00% 
Stand. Dev. 0.58% 0.57% 0.58% 0.71% 0.71% 0.46% 
Nº OBS 92 92 92 92 92 92 
 
Panel C – Open-end Funds 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Mean 1.43% 1.39% 1.34% 1.39% 1.30% 1.19% 
Median 1.34% 1.29% 1.26% 1.33% 1.25% 1.21% 
Maximum 2.25% 2.25% 2.25% 2.25% 2.25% 2.25% 
Minimum 0.92% 0.92% 0.92% 0.92% 0.74% 0.70% 
Stand. Dev. 0.41% 0.38% 0.36% 0.37% 0.41% 0.47% 
Nº OBS 10 10 10 10 10 10 
 
As previously mentioned, many studies have addressed the determinants of 
mutual fund expenses, while few have focused on real estate funds. The specificity of the 
real estate funds prevents use of certain variables that are used in mutual funds. For 
example, Korkeamaki and Smythe (2004) considered fund category (equity funds, bond 
funds, balanced funds, etc.) and the use of derivatives and Dellva and Olson (1998) took 
into account the location of securities (funds of local securities and funds of internationa l 
securities).   
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The determinants of fund expenses considered in this study are the following:  
 
Turnover (TR) - a proxy for management activism that is expected to present a positive 
sign as a determinant of real estate expenses once fund managers require a higher 
remuneration for their activism (see Dellva and Olson (1998), Lesseig et al. (2002) and 
Korpela and Puttonen (2006). However, we expect a higher sensibility of turnover on 
open-end funds in the face of subscriptions and redemptions on that category of real estate 
funds. This variable results from the sum of the value acquisitions and sales of a fund 
during a year divided by the monthly average of its net asset value over the same period. 
 
Size (LN (NAV)) - a proxy for economies of scale that we expect to present a negative 
sign (vd. Ferris and Chance (1991), Tufano and Sevick (1997), Berkowitz and Kotowitz 
(2002) and Golec (2003)). However, we would like to highlight the results obtained by 
Lesseig et al. (2002) that indicate that management fees are positively influenced by the 
value of the managed assets. Latzko (2003) concluded that economies of scale are 
observed in administrative costs in particular, but the same cannot be concluded for 
management fees. Korkeamaki and Simth (2003), in turn, found a positive relationship 
between size and total expenses. Moreover, Latzko (1999) and Gao and Livingston (2008) 
found a non-monotonic relationship because they did not detect the existence of 
economies of scale in larger funds. Size is measured by the logarithm of a fund´s net asset 
value at the end of year. 
 
Sharpe-Ratio (SR) - We expect a positive impact of SR on real estate expenses. Investors 
prefer managers that offer higher returns for a determined level of risk.  However, this 
does not always happen (vd. Haslen et al. (2008)). Luo (2002), for the US market, found 
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a positive impact of risk and return on mutual fund expenses. Gil-Bazo and Martinez 
(2004), on the other hand, only found a positive impact of risk on mutual fund 
management fees. Concerning returns, in general, the results show a positive relationship 
between such variables and fund expenses, but even in this case the results are not 
consensual (see Malhotra and McLeod (1997), Berkowitz and Kotowitz (2002) and 
Lesseig et al. (2002)). SR is obtained considering the funds´ annual profitability from 
2006 to 2011; the annualized volatility for the years 2006-11 is obtained by considering 
monthly data for two years. The one-year bond yield is the risk-free asset.   
 
Closed-end funds (CED) - It is expected that the coefficient sign of this variable is 
negative once the portfolio should present greater stability in comparison with open-end 
funds, requiring less activity and demand for information. However, Martin et al. (2001) 
found mixed results regardless of whether the closed-end funds and open-end funds 
manage local or international assets. This dummy variable assumes one for closed-end 
funds and zero for open-end funds.   
 
Age (LN (Age)) – It is expected that a fund commercialised for more years has been 
subjected to expense reduction given the increasing operating efficiency as a result of the 
learning curve (vd. Ferris and Chance (1987)); consequently, we expect that older funds 
will charge higher fees. However, even is this case, several authors have found a negative 
relationship between the two variables, namely Dellva and Olson (1998), Lesseig et al. 
(2002) and Luo (2002). The fund´s age is the number of years from the beginning of its 
trading until the year that is being analysed; 
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Independence (Indep) – a fund managed by a management fund company that belongs 
to a financial group should benefit from lower marketing and administrative costs due to 
economies of scale (vd. Frye (2001)). However, the fund manager can exploit the 
relationship between the client and the bank (a consequence of the clients being 
“hostages” of the financial group), requiring higher fees. On the other hand, independent 
firms may require a higher fee since the relation between the customer and the real estate 
fund company is closer. The relationship between fund expenses and independence in 
management is not completely evident. We use a dummy variable to differentiate real 
estate funds managed by independent financial firms from those managed by financ ia l 
conglomerates. This dummy variable assumes one for real estate funds managed by an 
independent real estate company. 
 
 In table II, we present the coefficient correlation between the independent and 
dependent variables. The results indicate that smaller and younger closed-end real estate 
funds charge lower fees. We admit that such a result is a consequence of the fiscal policy 
implemented by Portuguese authorities that served to benefit the recent development of 
real estate funds that took into account the needs of few participants to obtain a tax shield. 
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Table II – The Correlation coefficient between the independent and dependent variables. 
EF are fund expenses. TR (turnover) is the total value of acquisitions and sales during a year divided by 
the average net asset value of the fund. CEF (closed-end fund) is a dummy variable that assumes 1 for a 
closed-end fund. NAV is the fund’s net asset value. SR is the difference between annual return of a mutual 
fund and one-year fund yield divided by mutual fund volatility. Age is the fund’s number of years since 
it began trading. Indep is a dummy variable that assumes 1 when a fund is managed by an independent 
financial firm.  
Correlation 
p-value EF TR CEF 
LN 
(NAV)  SR LN (Age) Indep 
EF 1.00       
TR 0.07 1.00      
CEF -0.28 0.03 1.00     
LN (NAV)  -0.04 -0.14 -0.51 1.00    
SR -0.02 0.00 -0.13 0.11 1.00   
LN (Age) 0.06 -0.13 -0.31 0.59 0.08 1.00  
Indep 0.09 0.17 -0.02 0.08 0.00 0.19 1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To analyse the expenses´ determinants we consider the average of dependent and 
independent variables calculated between 2007 and 2012:  
EFi,t = β1 +  β2Xi,t−1+⋯….+βnXi,t−1 + 𝓊i,t 
where Xi.t-1 represents the different independent variables (with a one-year lag) used for 
the estimation; 𝓊i.t are random disturbances. 
The robustness tests are done using Fama-MacBeth (1973) approach. 
 
3. Results 
 
In Table III, the results of the multivariate analysis are presented. We analyse the entire 
sample of closed-end funds and open-end funds.  
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When the entire sample is considered, only two variables – CEF and size – present 
statistical significance to explain a fund´s expenses. This occurs because closed-end funds 
charge 0.76% annually on average, while open-end funds charge 1.34%.   In fact, the real 
estate fund´s expenses are lower in closed-end funds as expected. The maintenance of 
asset allocation policy by closed-end real estate funds and their goal, fundamenta l ly 
related to tax benefits, explain the lower fees charged by real estate asset managers.  
Regarding size, there is evidence of economies of scale. Larger funds, independent of 
being closed or open-end, charge lower fees. However, this suggests that the Portuguese 
authorities created a financial product fundamentally to benefit a small number of 
investors – even the largest closed-end funds have a small number of participants – to 
promote the real estate market. The largest closed-end fund only had 106 investors, which 
compares with 24.273 investors in the case of open-end funds. On average, while closed-
end funds presented 5.72 participants, open-funds had 5.237 participants. In the face of 
this opportunity many real estate fund companies emerged and seized a small part of the 
tax benefits. This can also be observed after seeing the negative sign of the Sharpe ratio 
(-.00032), when only closed-end funds are analysed. The negative impact of return and 
risk is rewarded by fiscal benefits. The opposite occurs for open-end funds, although 
without statistical significance (p-value = 0.46). In this case, investors are able to pay 
higher expenses that also require a higher Sharpe ratio.  
Concerning the remaining variables, the positive impact of turnover, fund age and 
independence on expenses should be highlighted, although without statistica l 
significance. This occurs because, as previously mentioned, Portuguese industry is 
primarily composed of closed-end funds that do not have an active investment policy; this 
explains why turnover does not have statistical significance. On the other hand, real estate 
investment companies played a decisive role in the development of closed-end funds and 
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require higher expenses in comparison with financial conglomerates, which are less 
focused on this financial product. They take advantage of the closer relationship with 
customers. Furthermore, in relation to the independence, it is plausible that this had 
happened because such companies have higher operating costs, in contrast with real estate 
fund companies integrated on financial groups that manage mutual funds and real estate 
funds. Relative to fund age, it is possible that competition between all players has reduced 
the fees charged to new real estate funds, particularly closed-end ones. Moreover, in the 
majority of cases, real estate funds are made according the customer needs (tailor made) 
and it is expected that older ones charge higher fees and, in contrast, that the new real 
estate funds arising in an adverse and competitive economic environment will offer lower 
expenses.  
When only closed-end funds are analysed we conclude that only size and the Sharpe 
ratio present statistical significance to explain fund expenses. As previously mentioned, 
such is related to economies of scale and the fiscal benefits of closed-end funds. Tax 
benefits are the real reward in creating a closed-end fund. The remaining variables 
maintain the sign, although without statistical significance.  
In relation to open-end funds we must highlight the results obtained regarding 
statistical significance for turnover, size and age. As in the case of closed-end funds the 
investors benefit from economies of scale, but the same cannot be concluded for 
economies of experience (age). Younger managers charge lower fees. In fact, the largest 
and the oldest open-end funds charge higher fees. However, higher expenses are required 
by the manager´s activity (turnover) in line with what was expected.  
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Table III – Multivariate analysis 
EF are fund expenses. TR (turnover) is the total value of acquisitions and sales during a year divided by the 
average net asset value of the fund. CEF is a dummy variable that assumes 1 for closed-end funds. SF is a 
dummy variable that assumes 1 for stock funds and 0 for the other ones. NAV is the fund net asset value. 
SR is the difference between annual return of a mutual fund and one-year fund yield divided by mutual 
fund´s volatility. Part is the number of investors of a mutual fund. Age is the fund´s number of years since 
it began trading. Indep is a dummy variable that assumes 1 when a fund is managed by an independent 
financial firm. White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance.  
  All Closed Open 
Intercept 0.03783 0.02742 0.03627 
p-value 0.00 0.01 0.05 
TR 0.00118 0.00117 0.02515 
p-value 0.30 0.31 0.03 
CEF -0.00872   
p-value 0.00   
LN (NAV) -0.00130 -0.00119 -0.00177 
p-value 0.02 0.00 0.06 
SR -0.00006 -0.00032 0.00002 
p-value 0.35 0.04 0.46 
LN (Age) 0.00031 0.00034 0.00322 
p-value 0.25 0.22 0.10 
Indep 0.00063 0.00083 -0.00002 
p-value 0.63 0.57 0.99 
Adj R2 0.13 0.08 0.73 
N 102 92 10 
 
 
In table IV, we use the approach of Fama and MacBeth (1973) as a robustness 
test. All of the previous results were confirmed in terms of their impact on fund expenses. 
However, after using this approach many variables present statistical significance. In the 
case of all sample (panel A) this can be concluded, not only for CEF and size, but for the 
remaining variables. And the same also can be said for closed-end funds (panel B). In the 
case of open-end funds (panel C), there are changes on the signs of the variables, which 
is possibly a consequence of having a small number of that type of real estate fund. A 
year-based analysis in this case is less reliable in comparison to the use of average for 
different variables.     
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Table IV – Multivariate analysis – Fama and MacBeth 
EF are fund expenses. TR (turnover) is the total value of acquisitions and sales during a year divided by the 
average net asset value of the fund. CEF is a dummy variable that assumes 1 for closed-end funds. NAV is 
the fund’s net asset value. SR is the difference between annual return of a mutual fund and one-year fund 
yield divided by mutual fund volatility. Age is the fund´s number of years since it began trading. Indep is 
a dummy variable that assumes 1 when a fund is managed by an independent financial firm. White 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance.  
 
Panel A - All 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2007-2012 
Intercept 0.03341 0.04064 0.03902 0.04462 0.03894 0.02530 0.03699 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
TR 0.00011 0.00047 0.00411 0.00038 0.00048 0.00026 0.00097 
p-value 0.70 0.66 0.01 0.53 0.67 0.81 0.09 
CEF -0.00918 -0.00635 -0.00812 -0.00929 -0.00860 -0.00630 -0.00797 
p-value 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
LN (NAV) -0.00098 -0.00165 -0.00142 -0.00165 -0.00135 -0.00073 -0.00130 
p-value 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.00 
SR -0.00012 -0.00006 0.00001 0.00002 -0.00026 0.00000 -0.00007 
p-value 0.05 0.64 0.93 0.70 0.00 0.86 0.09 
LN (Age) 0.00022 0.00029 0.00042 0.00024 0.00007 0.00004 0.00021 
p-value 0.44 0.28 0.12 0.47 0.82 0.85 0.01 
Indep 0.00136 0.00172 0.00116 0.00069 0.00063 0.00099 0.00109 
p-value 0.32 0.17 0.35 0.67 0.66 0.35 0.00 
Adj R2 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.08 0.25 0.08  
N 102 102 102 102 102 102  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B - Closed-end 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2007-2012 
Intercept 0.02428 0.03027 0.03274 0.03715 0.03248 0.01637 0.02888 
p-value 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 
TR 0.00012 0.00030 0.00408 0.00029 0.00054 0.00029 0.00094 
p-value 0.68 0.79 0.02 0.64 0.64 0.78 0.09 
LN (NAV) -0.00098 -0.00137 -0.00152 -0.00175 -0.00147 -0.00058 -0.00128 
p-value 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.00 
SR -0.00016 -0.00003 0.00001 0.00003 -0.00026 -0.00009 -0.00008 
p-value 0.06 0.79 0.92 0.63 0.00 0.27 0.06 
LN (Age) 0.00024 0.00030 0.00048 0.00029 0.00013 0.00002 0.00024 
p-value 0.43 0.29 0.09 0.41 0.67 0.93 0.00 
Indep 0.00135 0.00156 0.00086 0.00030 0.00015 0.00101 0.00087 
p-value 0.37 0.25 0.52 0.87 0.93 0.38 0.00 
Adj R2 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.21 0.04  
N 92 92 92 92 92 92   
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Panel C - Open-end 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2007-2012 
Intercept 0.04705 0.04666 -0.00514 0.02863 0.01756 0.07373 0.03475 
p-value 0.22 0.02 0.87 0.39 0.66 0.01 0.01 
TR 0.00963 0.00966 -0.01621 0.00408 -0.00363 -0.02445 -0.00349 
p-value 0.77 0.07 0.59 0.12 0.84 0.05 0.28 
LN (NAV) -0.00181 -0.00186 0.00124 -0.00097 -0.00098 -0.00241 -0.00113 
p-value 0.08 0.05 0.49 0.56 0.99 0.05 0.04 
SR -0.00004 0.00018 -0.00133 -0.00006 -0.00027 0.00001 -0.00025 
p-value 0.72 0.59 0.26 0.82 0.56 0.43 0.15 
LN (Age) 0.00033 0.00052 -0.00242 0.00102 -0.00163 -0.00591 -0.00135 
p-value 0.94 0.62 0.25 0.56 0.58 0.03 0.13 
Indep 0.00113 0.00030 0.00150 0.00135 0.00000 0.00000 0.00071 
p-value 0.82 0.87 0.65 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Adj R2 0.07 0.77 0.05 0.34 0.04 0.65  
N 10 10 10 10 10 10  
 
 
To evaluate the impact of survivor bias, we built an original unbalanced panel of 
real estate funds. We also used the approach by Fama and MacBeth (1973) to evaluate 
our previous results (table V, panels A, B and C). In general, the results do not differ from 
those presented in panels A, B and C of table IV.  
Summing up, closed-end funds charge lower fees and benefit from economies of 
scale. On the other hand, investors are available to pay expenses even when they are not 
rewarded in terms of risk and return once they benefit fro having fiscal economies of 
having that financial instrument.    
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Table V – Multivariate analysis – survivorship bias 
EF are fund expenses. TR (turnover) is the total value of acquisitions and sales during a year divided by the 
average net asset value of the fund. CEF is a dummy variable that assumes 1 for closed-end funds. NAV is 
the fund´s net asset value. SR is the difference between annual return of a mutual fund and one-year fund 
yield divided by mutual fund volatility. Age is the fund´s number of years since it began trading. Indep is 
a dummy variable that assumes 1 when a fund is managed by an independent financial firm. White 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance.  
Panel A – All 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2007-2012 
Intercept 0.03612 0.02507 0.07805 0.05159 0.05464 0.08367 0.05486 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 
TR 0.00000 0.00004 -0.00196 -0.00035 0.00030 -0.00239 -0.00073 
p-value 1.00 0.21 0.51 0.47 0.85 0.56 0.09 
CEF -0.00885 -0.00795 -0.01417 -0.01076 -0.00991 -0.00871 -0.01006 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
LN (NAV) -0.00195 -0.00172 -0.00524 -0.00237 -0.00243 -0.00254 -0.00271 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SR 0.00009 -0.00024 -0.00063 -0.00063 -0.00075 -0.00145 -0.00060 
p-value 0.76 0.31 0.42 0.11 0.09 0.22 0.01 
LN (Age) 0.00186 0.00262 0.00441 0.00108 0.00078 0.00067 0.00190 
p-value 0.02 0.00 0.16 0.58 0.72 0.92 0.01 
Indep 0.00166 0.00107 0.00276 0.00023 -0.00181 -0.00165 0.00038 
p-value 0.19 0.23 0.34 0.88 0.26 0.75 0.32 
Adj R2 0.23 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.06  
N 112 150 196 204 204 208  
 
Panel B - Closed-End 
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2007-2012 
Intercept 0.02169 0.01544 0.06625 0.04064 0.04444 0.06621 0.04245 
p-value 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.23 0.00 
TR 0.00004 0.00004 -0.00279 -0.00035 0.00037 -0.00238 -0.00084 
p-value 0.87 0.21 0.39 0.47 0.82 0.57 0.09 
LN (NAV) -0.00147 -0.00176 -0.00570 -0.00246 -0.00245 -0.00395 -0.00297 
p-value 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.00 
SR 0.00015 -0.00027 -0.00060 -0.00065 -0.00073 -0.00154 -0.00061 
p-value 0.66 0.29 0.49 0.13 0.14 0.24 0.02 
LN (Age) 0.00153 0.00297 0.00514 0.00133 0.00087 0.00147 0.00222 
p-value 0.09 0.00 0.14 0.53 0.72 0.85 0.01 
Indep 0.00131 0.00095 0.00287 0.00008 -0.00213 -0.00200 0.00018 
p-value 0.36 0.32 0.34 0.96 0.21 0.72 0.41 
Adj R2 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.01  
N 100 139 182 191 191 198   
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Panel C - Open-End 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2007-2012 
Intercept 0.02920 0.09001 0.02307 0.08070 0.05577 0.08786 0.06110 
p-value 0.17 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.25 0.00 
TR 0.01768 -0.02055 0.00518 -0.01632 -0.00595 -0.01240 -0.00539 
p-value 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.04 0.38 0.65 0.80 
LN (NAV) -0.00168 -0.00091 -0.00104 -0.00114 -0.00104 -0.00165 -0.00124 
p-value 0.00 0.34 0.09 0.24 0.08 0.05 0.00 
SR 0.00064 -0.00014 0.00051 -0.00048 -0.00049 -0.00035 -0.00005 
p-value 0.16 0.74 0.11 0.15 0.20 0.73 0.40 
LN (Age) 0.00620 -0.00671 0.00092 -0.00502 -0.00040 -0.00503 -0.00167 
p-value 0.01 0.09 0.30 0.07 0.88 0.37 0.22 
Indep 0.00217 0.00233 0.00013 0.00285 0.00497 0.00158 0.00234 
p-value 0.37 0.44 0.93 0.16 0.06 0.73 0.01 
Adj R2 0.84 0.49 0.68 0.45 0.49 0.21  
N 12 11 14 13 13 10  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we analyse the determinants of real estate funds domiciled in Portugal. The 
determinants of real estate fund expenses reflect the characteristics of the industry and its 
development. The fiscal policy developed by the Portuguese authorities stimulated the 
creation of real estate funds, particularly closed-end ones. Closed-end funds flourished 
once they were created, in most cases benefiting a small number of investors. In general, 
these types of funds were smaller and had a small number of investors whose main 
objective was to be rewarded by fiscal benefits even if the financial product presented 
higher risk and return. Instead of having a portfolio of individual real estate assets, they 
use a financial instrument to allocate their assets there, benefiting from fiscal benefits. 
Finally, we must highlight that both categories of real estate funds benefit from economies 
of scale.   
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